

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /092 W

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P R 210853Z JUL 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1702

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USIA WASHDC

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

USIA FOR IPS/E

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: STATEMENT TO BE GIVEN

BY THE NETHERLANDS REP DE VOS AT THE JULY 21

ALLIED PRESS CONFERENCE

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OT THE END-OF-THE-ROUND PRESS

STATEMENT TO BE GIVEN BY THE ALLIED SPOKESMAN (NETHERLANDS

REP DE VOS) AT THE JULY 21 POST-PLENARY PRESS CONFERENCE

AT 1300 HOURS VIENNA TIME. AT THAT TIME

CLASSIFICATION AND EMBARGO CAN BE REMOVED. THE STATEMENT WAS APPROVED

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AT THE JULY 20 MEETING OF THE AD HOC GROUP.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. DURING THE NEGOTIATING ROUND WHICH HAS JUST ENDED, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR A SERIOUS AND POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE IMPORTANT NEW PROPOSALS THEY PUT FORWARD ON DECEMBER 16.

2. THESE WESTERN PROPOSALS INCLUDE AN OFFER TO REDUCE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT AND US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS. WE HAVE ALSO OFFERED TO LIMIT US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OF THE TYPE REDUCED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS AND TO EXTEND THE COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TO COVER AIR FORCE MANPOWER AS WELL, IN A COMBINED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING.

3. THE US NUCLEAR WARHEADS WE PROPOSE TO REDUCE HAVE ENORMOUS FIREPOWER. THE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4'S AND THE PERSHING LAUNCHERS WE HAVE OFFERED TO REDUCE ARE THE TWO MOST POTENT NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE NATO FORCES IN THE AREA. THE LIMITATIONS ON THE RESIDUAL LEVELS OF ALL US NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE AREA AND OF THE US NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEM OF THE TYPE WITHDRAW WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED WILL BE IN EFFECT FOR THE DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND HAVE GREAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

4. IN ADDITION TO THESE NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS, THE WEST IS NOW OFFERING THE FOLLOWING:

-- FIRST, TO WITHDRAW A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF US SOLDIERS IN PHASE 1, AND TO ACCEPT A LIMITATION ON THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF US GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS;

-- SECOND, TO ACCEPT A COLLECTIVE LIMITATION ON THE OVERALL LEVEL OF WESTERN ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES;

-- THIRD, IN THE SECOND PHASE, TO MAKE THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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SIZEABLE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO REACH THE PROPOSED COMMON CEILING LEVEL IN THE GROUND FORCES OF BOTH SIDES.

-- FOURTH, IN CONNECTION WITH THESE FURTHER REDUCTIONS TO CONTINUE A COLLECTIVE LIMITATION ON WESTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FOR THE DURATION OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT IN THE FORM OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING TO BE ESTABLISHED

AS THE RESULT OF REDUCTIONS IN THE TWO PHASES; AND

-- FIFTH, TO EXTEND THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING
TO COVER AIR FORCE MANPOWER AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

5. IN MAKING THE DECEMBER 16 ADDITION TO THE REDUCTIONS
AND LIMITATIONS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED, WE HAVE NOT
ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS FROM THE EAST. OUR AIM WAS
TO GAIN EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF REDUCTIONS LEADING TO
APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THAT
REMAINS THE CENTRAL WESTERN OBJECTIVE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR THIS WESTERN OBJECTIVE.
CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE SCENE OF THE GREATEST CONFRONTATION OF
MILITARY FORCES IN THE WORLD. MOREOVER, THIS CONFRONTATION
IS CHARACTERIZED BY SERIOUS IMBALANCES BETWEEN THE FORCES
OF EAST AND WEST IN THAT THE EAST HAS A LARGE AND DESTABILIZING
SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

7. AGREEMENT ON A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON THE GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET
TANK ARMY, WOULD RESULT IN A MORE STABLE BALANCE OF GROUND
FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AT LOWER LEVELS. WE CONSIDER THIS
RESULT -- NAMELY, ENHANCED STABILITY -- WOULD BE MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL.

8. HOWEVER, THE EASTERN RESPONSE TO OUR DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL
HAS THUS FAR BEEN DISAPPOINTING. IT IS CLEAR TO US, FROM
COMMENTS EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE MADE ABOUT OUR PROPOSALS,
THAT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE NOT YET GRASPED THEIR FULL
SIGNIFICANCE. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CRITICIZED
DETAILED ASPECTS OF OUR PROPOSALS, WITHOUT LOOKING AT THEM
AS A WHOLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING WHICH
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SHARPLY AFFECTS THEIR MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

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9. ONE IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SETTING IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE OF BEING LOCATED IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE POTENTIAL AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE LARGE FORCES LOCATED ON SOVIET TERRITORY HAVE EASY AND RAPID ACCESS TO CENTRAL EUROPE. THEIR SIZE WOULD NOT BE LIMITED BY AGREEMENT.

10. WHEN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ARE EVALUATED IN A COMPREHENSIVE WAY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR POTENTIAL EFFECTS IN THE CONCRETE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THEIR SIGNIFICANCE BECOMES FULLY APPARENT.

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11. IN RETURN, WE ARE ASKING THE EAST TO WITHDRAW A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN PHASE I AND TO UNDERTAKE A PHASE I COMMITMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE TO A COMMON CEILING ON THE OVERALL MILITARY MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES.

12. WHEN THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WESTERN PACKAGE IS PROPERLY EVALUATED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE RELEVANT

FACTORS INCLUDING EASTERN GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES, THEN IT IS APPARENT THAT THAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE IS VERY GREAT AND THAT THE WEST IS OFFERING AT LEAST AS MUCH AS IT IS ASKING FOR FROM THE EAST. AND THE OUTCOME WE PROPOSE, APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND EQUALITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, IS INHERENTLY EQUITABLE.

13. AS REGARDS THE EASTERN POSITION, THE EAST PUT FORWARD A NEW VERSION OF ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS ON FEB 19. THIS LATEST VERSION OF THE EASTERN PROGRAM INVOLVES NO CHANGE IN THE APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS WHICH THE EAST HAS TAKEN FROM THE OUTSET OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE EAST IS STILL CALLING FOR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE EAST'S PROPOSALS, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD CONSOLIDATE IN TREATY FORM THE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN SOLDIERS AND TANKS AND OTHER ARMAMENTS. THEY WOULD ALSO IMPOSE NATIONAL CEILINGS ON THE POST-REDUCTION LEVELS OF THE FORCES OF EVERY DIRECT PARTICIPANT, THUS INTERFERING WITH NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENSE SYSTEM AND PREJUDICING THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

14. NOR DOES THE EASTERN FEB 19 PROPOSAL MEET THE CENTRAL WESTERN INTERESTS IN PHASED NEGOTIATIONS. THE NON-US WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE OFFERED TO UNDERTAKE A GENERAL COMMITMENT IN PHASE I TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING. WE WANT THE EAST FOR ITS PART TO UNDERTAKE IN PHASE I THE SAME COMMITMENT TO REDUCE TO A COMMON CEILING IN HASE II, AND ALSO TO IMPLEMENT PHASE I SOVIET REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL MOVE TOWARD APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES. THESE ACTIONS WOULD CREATE THE CONFIDENCE NECESSARY FOR THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO MAKE A FINAL DECISION ON THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THEIR PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THE FEB 19 EASTERN PROPOSAL DOES REPRESENT A MODIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION AS REGARDS THE SEQUENCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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REDUCTIONS AND THE PROVISION FOR TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. BUT IT DOES NOT MEET THE CENTRAL WESTERN INTERESTS IN PHASED NEGOTIATIONS WHICH I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED.

15. WE CANNOT REGARD THIS LATEST VERSION OF THE EASTERN APPROACH AS AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER OF DEC 16. THAT WESTERN OFFER REPRESENTED A SUBSTANTIAL ADDITION TO THE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED WESTERN REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS AND WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. AS I HAVE POINTED OUT, THE EAST HAS MADE NO CHANGE WHATEVER IN ITS BASIC REDUCTION APPROACH.

16. DURING THIS ROUND, THE EAST TABLED SOME DATA ON EASTERN FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS IS A POSITIVE STEP, THOUGH LONG

OVERDUE. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN OUR DATA AND THE DATA THE EAST HAS TABLED. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US WHETHER THE EASTERN FIGURES HAVE BEEN COMPUTED ON A BASIS COMPARABLE TO OURS. OBVIOUSLY, THE REASONS FOR THESE DISCREPANCIES WILL NEED TO BE FULLY DISCUSSED AND MADE CLEAR IN THE NEXT ROUND.

17. IN SUM, I WOULD SAY THAT THE PAST ROUND HAS BROUGHT THE EASTERN TABLING OF DATA, THOUGH IT IS NOT CLEAR ON WHAT BASIS THE EAST HAS COMPUTED ITS DATA. BUT THE PAST ROUND HAS NOT BROUGHT A SERIOUS AND POSITIVE EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF DEC 16. IF THE EAST TOO IS INTERESTED, AS IT SAYS IT IS, IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME, THEN IT IS UP TO THE EAST TO MAKE SUCH A RESPONSE. IT IS THIS WHICH COULD BRING REAL PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. RESOR

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